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 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 11-4193 
 ___________ 
 
 IN RE:  WILMER GAY, 
        Petitioner 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On a Petition for Writ of Mandamus from the 
 Eastern District Court of the Pennsylvania 
 (Related to E.D. Pa. Civ. No. 11-cv-04194) 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Rule 21, Fed. R. App. P. 
December 22, 2011 
 
Before:  AMBRO, JORDAN and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed: January 5, 2012) 
_________________ 
 
 OPINION 
 _________________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
Wilmer Gay has filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in which he asks us to “set 
aside” an order, issued by the Chief Judge of the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, which reassigned his civil rights action to Judge Mary 
A. McLaughlin from Judge Thomas N. O’Neill.  For the following reasons, we will deny 
the petition.  
In June 2011, Gay filed a civil rights action and an application to proceed in forma 
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pauperis (“IFP”) in the United States District Court for the Central District of California.  
The California District Court immediately transferred the matter to the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania, where, it concluded, a majority of the alleged events occurred.  In the 
Eastern District, the case was assigned to Judge O’Neill, who ordered that Gay’s IFP 
application be denied because he had sufficient assets to pay the full filing fee.  Gay filed 
a motion for reconsideration and for “disqualification” of Judge O’Neill.  Judge O’Neill 
“ask[ed] the Chief Judge to assign another Judge to this matter.”  Consequently, by order 
entered July 22, 2011, the Chief Judge reassigned the case to Judge McLaughlin.
1
  Gay 
filed a mandamus petition, asking this Court to “set aside” the order reassigning the case 
because it is “devoid of a signature of [the] Chief Judge . . . to substantiate its validity as 
. . . mandated by Local Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 40.3.1.”   
A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy.  In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. 
Litig., 418 F.3d 372, 378 (3d Cir. 2005).  To justify its use, a petitioner must demonstrate 
that “(1) no other adequate means [exist] to attain the relief he desires, (2) the party’s 
right to issuance of the writ is clear and indisputable, and (3) the writ is appropriate under 
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 Thereafter, Judge McLaughlin denied Gay’s motion for reconsideration, stating that 
Gay could reinstate the case by remitting the filing fee within 30 days.  Rather than pay, 
Gay filed another motion for reconsideration.  Judge McLaughlin denied the motion by 
order entered October 13, 2011.  Gay did not file a notice of appeal.  To the extent that 
Gay challenges the denial of IFP status, we conclude that mandamus relief is not 
warranted.  See In re Nwanze, 242 F.3d 521, 524-25 (3d Cir. 2001) (stating that a 
mandamus petitioner must show that he has an indisputable right to the writ and that 
there exists no other adequate remedy); Abdul-Akbar v. McKelvie, 239 F.3d 307, 311 (3d 
Cir. 2001) (holding that an “order denying leave to proceed I.F.P. is a final, collateral 
order appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.”). 
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the circumstances.”  Hollingsworth v. Perry, 130 S. Ct. 705, 710 (2010) (per curiam) 
(quotation marks and citation omitted).  No such showing has been made in this case.   
While a mandamus petition is a proper means of challenging a district judge’s 
refusal to recuse himself pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455, see In re Sch. Asbestos Litig., 977 
F.2d 764, 774-75 (3d Cir. 1992), Gay seeks to challenge an order effectively providing 
the relief that he sought, namely, the assignment of this case to a different judge.  
Nevertheless, Gay complains that the order reassigning the case was not signed by the 
Chief Judge, citing as support Local Rule of Civil Procedure 40.3.1(2).  But that Rule 
pertains in relevant part to “reassignment of substantial numbers of cases” and does not 
refer to signatures required on court orders.  Local Rule 5.1.2(13), however, provides that 
“[a]ny order filed electronically without the original signature of a judge has the same 
force and effect as if the judge had affixed the judge’s signature to a paper copy of the 
order and it had been entered on the docket in paper copy filed in the traditional manner.”  
Here, although the order reassigning the case did not contain the Chief Judge’s original 
signature above his typed name, it did include the Clerk’s electronic signature, attesting 
to the validity of the order.  Under these circumstances, we conclude that there is no basis 
upon which to “set aside” the reassignment order. 
Accordingly, the petition for a writ of mandamus is denied. 
 
  
